One premise of the notion of "personalized medicine" is that an individual's unique genetic makeup provides key information to guide prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of disease. Indeed, it is highly probable that no one besides you has ever been born, or ever will be again, with your precise DNA base sequence (except, perhaps, if you are an identical twin, and even then maybe not). Hence, in principle, your complete DNA sequence precisely identifies you, and anyone with access to even partial information about your genotype could, in theory, identify you as the source of your DNA sequence. This risk of breach of privacy is frequently included in consent forms for DNA sequencing or genotyping, whether for medical reasons, research, or recreation (such as searching for ancestors). To date, the risk has been theoretical, but a recent report by Gymrek et al. (1 ) shows that real breach of privacy is feasible with access to limited genomic data, bare-bones demographic information, and publicly available Internet tools. Now that we know it can be done, how should this potential for breach of privacy change our approach to collection of genomic data?
Gymrek et al. focused on identification of male surnames from Y chromosome short tandem repeat (Y-STR) 2 genotypes (2 ) (Fig. 1 ). These repeats are stretches of 3-5 DNA bases (usually 4), repeated multiple times (in the range of 10 -20), that are located at multiple sites along the Y chromosome. The exact number of repeats of any particular sequence differs from one Y chromosome to another, but it is a stable heritable trait. Genotyping or sequencing can easily identify specific alleles at dozens of these loci, providing a kind of "fingerprint" of a specific Y chromosome. Indeed, a major use of Y-STR genotyping is forensic, for example in identifying the source of DNA in cases of sexual assault. The approach is also used in consumer-oriented genealogy-tracking services, because it permits an individual to identify relatives with similar Y chromosome haplotypes and to trace lineage from historical patterns of migration of individuals with particular haplotypes.
Gymrek et al. took advantage of the fact that Y chromosome haplotypes tend to segregate with surnames, at least in individuals of European ancestry, barring complications such as misattributed paternity, name changes, and so forth. They made use of 2 databases that identify surnames associated with specific Y-STR alleles and first showed that the approach could match surnames from a cohort of Y-genotyped individuals of known surname. By adjusting the parameters of a recovery algorithm, they were able to correctly infer a surname from genotypic data in 12% of cases for US Caucasian males, with an error rate of 5% and unknown rate of 83%. Any particular surname might narrow the search to only tens of thousands of US males, but addition of year of birth and state of residence, neither of which is protected by the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), could narrow the search to fewer than 20 individuals. Finally, Gymrek et al. showed that Y-STR haplotypes could be inferred from genome sequence data, including from publicly available sequences.
This approach permitted them to correctly identify the source of some well-known publicly accessible DNA sequences, such as that of Craig Venter (3 ) and of individuals from a collection of Utah residents of Northern and Western European ancestry who had participated in research sequencing projects. From 5 individuals representing 3 families, the identities of entire families could be inferred by combining the genotypic data, year of birth, and state of residence. This result, which was widely reported in the media, shows that an individual can be identified, at least in some cases, from access to his or her genome sequence, given publicly available information, algorithms that are far less than "CIA-grade," and sufficient motivation.
The approach is powerful, but limitations should be recognized. The most obvious is that the key to entry to a family is a male who has been genotyped, because only Y chromosomes correlate with surnames. Second, Ͼ80% of Y sequences could not be linked unambiguously to a surname. Third, it helps to have a common surname to maintain privacy, because the pool of possible matches is much greater for common names.
What does that mean for the future of genotyping and genome sequencing, whether for personal, medical, or research uses? It gives real meaning to the warn-ing that privacy cannot be guaranteed when an individual provides consent for genomic testing. It would not be difficult to imagine creating algorithms that would make individual identification easy to do, perhaps as a form of recreation in its own right, and perhaps for other purposes. Such purposes could include tracking of individuals, targeted advertising, forensic identification, and uses by health providers or insurers. Some of these potential uses might be prohibited by existing laws, for example the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) (4 ), which bars the use of genetic information for decisions regarding employment or health insurance. Other uses are currently not under current legal protections, however.
How is this potential invasion of privacy different from other instances in which an individual gives up privacy? In modern society, privacy may well be an illusion for anyone who drives or even walks on the street, and certainly for anyone who uses a credit card, smart phone, or the Internet. Our whereabouts can be tracked by cameras at intersections or toll booths and by cell phone signals. Our purchases, and even our comings and goings, can largely be reconstructed from our credit card purchases; every Internet site we visit leaves a footprint in our computer and in the server we contacted. Sometimes this information can be used by legal authorities, whether to catch a criminal or fine a traffic violator. Other times it is used by advertisers who try to get our attention after doing a search or even reading an e-mail message. It can be used by long-lost friends trying to establish contact. If we are not careful, it can also be used by identity thieves, who may damage our credit. Yet despite these risks, use of the Internet, credit cards, and, of course, our streets, continues more or less unimpeded, given the enormous conveniences that they offer. Whether these risks equal those posed by loss of privacy of genomic information may be debated, but one cannot argue that genomics provides the first incursion on individual privacy associated with the application of large data sets.
Given the strong public benefit from research and clinical application of genomics, it is important to instill confidence that the risk of harm is minimized. Gymrek et al. wrote, "existing policy tools, such as controlled-access databases with data use agreements, may mediate the exposure of genomic information to surname inference." They stress that if concern about privacy were to inhibit public willingness to participate in studies and allow data sharing, the effects on scientific progress would be "devastating." Legal protection offered by GINA should minimize the risk of misuse by employers and health insurance companies. Ultimately, however, there may be some risk that no amount of legal protection can eliminate. Acceptance of this risk may be pragmatic, as it is for accepting the risk involved with credit card transactions. In the case The particular marker highlighted consists of the sequence TAGA repeated between 10 and 19 times. A specific Y-STR set of genotypes is used to query a database of haplotypes and surnames. The matching surname is then combined with information on year of birth and state of residence in an attempt to identify a specific individual who was the source of the Y genotype.
of genomics, there is potential personal and public benefit from the application of genomics to improve health. Participation in genomics research may ultimately depend on individual altruism, with participants weighing the personal risks against benefits that may accrue to individuals and to society. Recognizing this motivation places an additional responsibility on researchers, not only to incorporate every reasonable safeguard to preserve privacy but also to recognize the research participant as a true partner, from the planning of the study to the final disposition of the resulting data.
